Hello There. I have had an interest in this little known battle for many years, since reading about it in an old copy of Military Modelling, and I have decided to expand on the limited resources in English, to make this battle more available to wargamers that are interested in the Desert War.
Part of this feature was used for a feature in Wargames, Soldier and Strategy and this has been magnified to produce this work.
The
Battle of Bir Hacheim has slipped by many British wargamers and
students of military history, probably because of the almost total
lack of British involvement despite the importance of the result on
the 8th Army at the time. This has lead to a lack of
English language sources.
History
books merely state that the small fortress held out against Rommel
and the Afrika Korps while the remainder of the army withdrew to
safety at El Alamein, a name that provides a whole different chapter
in the history of the desert war, (6).
I
first became aware of the battle when I read a feature in the June
1986 edition of Military Modelling by Stuart Asquith. The
illustrations by Rick Scollins also caught my eye. Both contributors
now departed and a sad and great loss to the wargaming world they
both are, (6).
Here
is a description of the days at Bir Hacheim, as far as my meagre
interpretation of French and the scarce internet and written sources
can allow.
Here are some photos of different games refighting different parts of the defence of Bir Hacheim. The trench system is modular and all scratchbuilt.
At
0430 hours on the 26th May 1942 General Erwin Rommel
showed General Sir Claude Auchinlek that he had won the race to rearm
and resupply his forces to recommence the struggle in North Africa
for control of the area, (2 pg 33).
After
a number of see-saw engagements since 11 June 1940, first between
British and Italian forces, then later axis and British/Commonwealth
troops Rommel was now attacking the Allied defensive line bulk
stretching from Gazala on the coast to Bir Hacheim, (also Bir
Hakeim), in the desert interior, (2, pg 12).
Rommels
plan was to mislead Auchinlek’s subordinate, Lieutenant General
Neil Ritchie, (commander of Eighth Army), into expecting an attack in
the centre and north of the Gazala line. This would induce the
British commanders to deploy their armour into the area while Rommel
would turn the open flank of the defensive line and allow him to
attack the allied and commonwealth forces in the flank and rear, (2
pg 32).
This
ruse would be aided by Gruppe Cruwell, consisting of the Italian X
and XXI Corps, (Sabratha, Trento, Brescia and Pavia divisions),the
bulk of the German artillery, a German infantry brigade and two
Italian armoured regiments, attacking positions held by the British
50th Division and the 1st South African
Division. These forces were situated between the ‘road’, the Trig
Capuzzo, and the coast. The armoured forces were accompanied by earo
engines mounted on lorries which stirred up dust to simulate the
movement of large numbers of vehicles. These vehicles were meant to
be visible to make the British think this was the main offensive, (3,
pg 114). The armour would then be withdrawn from the attack once the
allies came to the conclusion they were under an all arms attack. The
axis armoured divisions would then be sent south to turn the open
flank joining further armoured units under Rommel’s command, (15th,
21st Panzer Divisions, 90th Light, Ariete and
Trieste Divisions), (1 pg 84, 2, pg 33)
The
British forces had deployed four divisions and two brigades in the
north of the defensive line and only two divisions and three brigades
in the south.
The
plan went well, to begin with. The British commanders, (Ritchie and
Norrie), did not know if the enemy movements south of Bir Hacheim
were a feint, to draw their forces south, which would leave their
centre weak, or if Rommel was attempting to turn their flank and draw
their forces away from the main attack. Ritchie expected Rommel to
drive straight for Tobruk, (2, pg 35, 1, pg 87).
New
German intelligence received just before the start of the assault
discovered the end of the Gazala line, (3, pg 114), This prompted the
diverting of the Italian Ariete, (armoured) and Trieste, (all arms)
Divisions to take the position manned by the 1st Free
French Brigade, (4, pg112). Unfortunately Trieste division did not
get their change of orders so did not change their direction of
advance so entered the minefields of the Gazala line north of Bir
Hacheim, receiving artillery fire from the British 150th
Brigade ‘box’, (some sources say that the Italian commander did
not make a mistake in his navigation but diverted part of his force
to deal with the artillery fire which was engaging his flank), (12).
The Trieste Division began to clear a narrow passage through the
minefield but were hindered in their early movements by a sudden sand
storm which did not aid their navigation, (8, pg 112-4).
I
find it difficult to believe that the DAK knew about the Gazala line
but not where it were it ended since it was being built since 14
February and wash the critical flank to be turned, (ST). Also the
intelligence sources Rommel had access to was extensive and I feel
would not have been this misleading.
Here the Italian forces move forward to the attack. The initial forces consisted of Bersaglieri
battalions which supported the Ariete division in its first attacks.
Meanwhile
the larger force of Ariete, 90th light and 15th
Panzer Division were being observed from a distance driving around
the flank of the Gazala line by the 4th South African
Armoured Car Regiment on 27th May at 06.30 hours, (2, pg
33).
The
Ariete Division, commanded by General Guiseppe De Stefanis, (3, pg
114), encountered a fortified position, another position DAK
intelligence failed to detect, (3, pg 114). Actually it was point
171, slightly south east of the Bir Hacheim position manned by the
3rd Indian Motor Brigade. Believing it to be Bir Hacheim,
at 0730 hours, they deployed the 8th Armoured Battalion on
the left, 9th Armoured battalion to the right followed by
the 10th Armoured Battalion and 8th Bersaglieri
Regiment. Softskin vehicles of the Axis attackers scattered as they
came under artillery fire, (3, pg 114).
As
this was in progress the remainder of the Axis forces bypassed this
defensive works. Brigadier Filose, commander of the 3rd
Indian Motor Brigade reported to Major General Messervy at 7th
Armoured Division HQ that, ‘The whole bloody Africa Corps is drawn
up in front of me like a bloody review’, (4, pg 156). This report
made the situation clearer for General Ritchie, (4, pg 156). Although
Brigadier Filose was only being attacked by the Ariete Division he
was bypassed by the 90th Light who went onto attack the
‘Retma Box’ further to the east of Bir Hacheim, manned by the
British 7th Motor Brigade and the 7th Armoured
Division. The 21st and 15th Panzer divisions
began to swing north, behind the Gazala Line, (2, pg 33, 35).
Under cover of a cloud of dust the German forces advance.
Back
with the Italian attack at point 171 the defending 3rd
Indian Motor Brigade the 18th Cavalry Regiment and 2nd
Royal Lancers were quickly overrun. This was in part due to the
defenders having only just been deployed recently to the area. They
had little chance to improve the defences of the position so were
only partially dug in and at the time of the attack had only received
30 of their 64 2pdr anti tank guns. The 3rd Indian Motor
Brigade suffered 453 killed and lost 600 prisoners in the attack. The
rest dispersed into the desert towards allied lines, (3, pg 114).
The
attacking Italian forces learned from their prisoners that they had
not captured Bir Hacheim after all and now turned north to attack
their intended target, (3, pg 116).
They
approached the French barb wire at 08.15 hours from the south east
leading the defenders to initially believe they were British tanks,
(3, pg 116, 117).
Due
to the late change of orders Ariete Division had no idea where the
Trieste Division had gone however they charged at the French position
at 09.00 hours. They broke the barb wire perimeter near the east
entrance and started to cross the anti tank minefield, which they
were not aware of until too late. Once in front of the east entrance
they made a quarter turn to the left and charged. The first anti tank
shells were fired at 400 metres and the last at a few metres, (3, pg
116, 117).
Here different attacks by Axis forces try to breach the French defences
The
commander of the 9th Armoured Battalion, Colonel
Prestisimone, who had already had one tank knocked out under him that
day, now lost another tank but broke into the defensive box with five
other tanks. One of these tanks fired a shell into the company HQ at
fifteen yards range, without killing the officer inside, and a
Captain Morel of the French Foreign Legion burnt the company flag to
stop it falling into enemy hands, (3, pg 116, 117, 118, 8, pg 4).
Capitan Otte continued giving orders on the field telephone until a
tank appeared 15 yards from his position and a shell went through his
shelter, (1, pg 107). This reference says Capt Otte burnt the company
flag.
Further Italian armoured units continued their approach to the French defences only to be turned back at the last moment.
This
was the high water mark of this attack as these tanks were quickly
knocked out by the 75mm field guns in the area. The last remaining
tank was attacked by a number of Legionnaires on foot firing through
the tanks vision slits, killing the crew, (1, pg 107, 8, pg 4).
The
remaining surviving tank crews were taken prisoner. An indication of
the multi national nature of this battle, one Italian tank crew found
himself being made prisoned by two fellow Venetians! Colonel
Prestimone was also injured and taken prisoner, (3, pg 117).
A
second attack by the Ariete Division at 11.30 hours failed to breech
the minefield and the tanks withdrew at 10.00 hours after losing 31
tanks, 1 semovente, 124 causalities and 60 prisoners, (3, pg 116). In
comparison the defenders lost a handful of casualties, 1 gun and a
truck. During this attack a legionnaire staff sergeant resorted to
clearing a jammed shell in a 75mm field gun using a ramrod and a
hammer down the barrel of the gun! (3, pg 117, 8, pg4).
Italian Bersaglieri cross the outer barbwire and advance under fire
At
this point, still on the 27th, the 90th Light
Division and other DAK forces to the north were being attacked by
strong British forces and Ariete Division were called upon to assist
them at Bir El Harmat. The rest of the day was quiet for the Bir
Hacheim defenders, (3, pg 117).
The
28th May dawned to find Rommel arriving at General Ettore
Baldassarre’s HQ, (Newly promoted to command the Italian XX
Motorised Corps). The Ariete Division had arrived after their attack
on Bir Hacheim and had escorted supply trucks to meet the 90th
Light at Rigel Ridge, (3, pg 118).
Little
happened during this day. In the morning aircraft from the RAF bombed
part of the area around the fortress. This was because they had
mistaken the Abandoned Italian vehicles in the minefield as Axis held
ground, (8, pg 4). Captain Lamaze led a group out to destroy these
vehicles to stop them receiving further attention. He also led a
detachment to engage Italian armoured cars which were observing the
northern minefield. In later reports two of these armoured cars were
destroyed and four more drove into the minefield and were damaged,
(1, pg 108).
Later
the Luftwaffe attacked Bir Hacheim for the first time and causalities
were inflicted on the Battalion du Pacific who were manning the south
west sector of the defences. In turn the RAF carried out air attacks
on the Axis forces around Bir Hacheim, (3, pg 108).
A
column was sent out during the day to make contact with the 150th
Brigade box to the north of the fortress. This was driven back by
Italian artillery fire but the column also inflicted losses on some
of the pursuing Italian vehicles, (9, pg 3). In one reference, (9, pg
3), it states that seven enemy half tracks were destroyed. Captain
Lamaze was tasked with covering enemy attempts to clear the northern
minefield. Two enemy armoured cars were destroyed and four more drove
into the minefield and were lost, (1, pg 108).
The aggressive patrols carried out by the Free French included this local modification of a SA37 anti tank gun added to a bren carrier. I have not found any testimonials as to how the recoil of the gun affected the firer.
As
this incident and Captain Lamaze’ attacks on Italian armoured cars
to the north of Bir Hacheim defences are from different sources and
are in roughly the same area they maybe the same incident. I have
been unable to clarify this, (ST, 1, pg 108).
During
the night of 28th/29th May further supplies
were bought in, in the shape of forty tons of 75mm ammunition. The
defenders maintained an aggressive stance carrying out night time
patrols and taking a number of Italians prisoner, (3, pg 108).
The
29th May was quiet with further patrolling carried out.
This resulted in three German tanks claimed destroyed by a patrol led
by Captain de Saringe. These may have been Italian vehicles as the
German forces were now in the ‘cauldron’ behind the Gazala line
and the further prisoners taken were Italian, (9, pg 3).
The
defenders heard on this day that the British 4th Armoured
and 7th Infantry Brigades had been pushed back to Bir El
Gobi and El Aden, meaning they were now surrounded. However General
Koenig still had time to apologise to the Italian prisoners for the
poor standard of their conditions, (9, pg 3, 1, pg 112).
On
the 30th May the axis forces had been making continuous
infiltrations into the minefields of the Gazala line and Bir Hacheim
defences, (9, pg 33).
Axis forces approaching the barb wire line to clear the minefields
X
Corps, consisting of the Sabratha, Trento, Bresicia and Pavia
Infantry Divisions had been assaulting the Gazala Line far to the
north, opposite the defensive boxes of, (from north to south), the
3rd South African, 2nd South African, 1st
South African and 69th Brigades. Progress had been made
through the minefield, (1, pg 78,79).
The Trieste division was still progressing through similar
defences opposite 150th Infantry Brigade but the path
cleared was inadequate to pass supplies through as it was under
artillery fire from the defensive box and Sidi Muftah behind it, (3,
pg 120). Rommels intelligence unit now discovered the presence of the
150th Brigade and needed to clear this area to supply axis
forces behind the Gazala Line, so avoiding the round trip beyond Bir
Hacheim and saving precious petrol, (3, pg 120, 1, pg 110).
At
Bir Hacheim patrols were sent out to seal any breaches in the
minefield but these troops, led by Colonel Amilakhvari were ambushed
and rescued by a company of infantry with bren carriers commanded by
Lieutenant Messmer, (9, pg 3).
620
thirsty Indian soldiers entered the position today. These were the
remains of the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade, (from point 171),
(9, pg 3), and they brought news that four of their 25lb field guns
were abandoned at their original position. A patrol was arranged to
retrieve what they could to aid in the defence of Bir Hacheim. Three
guns were recovered, (No Reference). Some of these Indian troops also
described how they had been taken prisoner then released into the
desert as the axis forces had no facilities to detain them. This
could also have been done to deliberately strain the water supplies
at Bir Hacheim, (9, pg 3, 1, pg 112).
The
end of the 30th and the start of the 31st, was
quiet at Bir Hacheim as Rommel and the axis forces were gathering to
attack 150th Infantry Brigade to improve his supply lines.
Bir Hacheims minefields had been breached in places by axis night
patrols but these were known to the defenders and used as cleared
lanes for the French to mount day time patrols led by Colonel
Amilakvari and Lieutenant Colonel Roux to harass the Axis forces in
the area, (1, pg 112).
On
31st May, General Koenig received orders from British XXX
Corps to be ready to advance some of his forces, I assume to
frustrate Axis build up of troops, armour and supplies fighting in
the ‘Cauldron’. This force was to comprise of the Battalion du
Pacific, an anti tank, anti aircraft and artillery components, (1, pg
112).
Rommel
was caused to retreat due to attacks from the 150 brigade box. He
would continue attacks on the next day, (9, pg 3)
During
the night of the 31st, part of the 101st
transport company arrived commanded by Captain Dulau. They bought
urgently needed water for the defenders. On return they removed the
Indian soldiers, 170 Italian prisoners and various French and Axis
wounded, (1, pg 112, 10, pg 282).
On
the 1st June the 150th Brigade box fell to
Rommels forces at 14.30 hours but his supply route was still
threatened by the troops in Bir Hacheim, (2, pg 52, 10, pg 278).
The
column, mentioned earlier, left the fortress defences today, (1, pg
112). Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Broche. Both this column and
Bir Hacheim were attacked by Axis aircraft, (1, pg 112). This column
reached El Telm by night fall but unfortunately this order was later
countermanded by XXX Corps but Koenig was unable to contact the
column due to poor and intermittent radio communications they could
not be recalled the same day. They were finally contacted on 2nd
June, (1, pg 113, 8, pg 5).
The
Naval Fusiliers that were operating the bofors anti aircraft guns
they had been recently trained on, (so recently that they were not
able to carry out their final exam due to enemy attacks on Bir
Hacheim), but appear to have given an effective account of
themselves, (1, pg 113).
Here many of the French 75mm anti tank gun positions are shown warding off the German and Italian armoured attacks
The Infanterie de la marine, (commanded by Captain Laborde), the 22nd
North African Company, (Captain Lequense) and a battery of 75mm guns
were moved to fill the gap in the defences left by the Battalion de
Pacific, (1, pg113).
Overnight
a further supplies arrived in the shape of 1000 bofors gun rounds,
(1, pg 113). Also on this night the American Field Service, (AFS),
were requested to evacuate wounded from Bir Hacheim. They drove to
the defence this night, arrived at 0700 hours on the 2nd
and hid in a sandstorm to get back to their lines.
On
2nd June General Koenig had considered reporting to 7th
Armoured Division HQ, to get clarification of the situation outside
of Bir Hacheim. He decided to send his British liaison, Captain
Tomkins. This was fortuitous as Tomkins was captured by a German
reconnaissance patrol while travelling to 7th Armoured
Division HQ, (1, pg 113).
Meanwhile
the Column led by Colonel Broche, was unknown. All contact had been
lost as their radios had failed. Koenig finally managed to contact
the Battalion du Pacific and ordered them to return to Bir Hacheim.
Rommel
still needed to secure his supply lines by eliminating resistance at
Bir Hacheim. To achieve this he sent the Italian Trieste Division,
armoured reconnaissance units from the Pavia Division and the German
90th Light Division. The German force would attack from
the south and the Italians from the north, (5, pg 3).
Before
this attack materialised two Italian officers approached the outer
defences at 10.30 hours. Under a flag of truce they were blindfolded
and taken to General Koenig. Unfortunately Koenig and Masson,
(Koenigs Chief staff officer), could not speak Italian and the
officers could not speak French. After a confused exchange it was
believed the Italian officers offered terms of surrender to avoid
further lives being lost. This offer was politely refused and the
officers returned to the perimeter. It is believed that Koenig
reported, ‘We have not come here to surrender’, (8, pg 6, 1, pg
114).
Captain
Lamaze, who was commanding a detachment outside of Bir Hacheim
reported a gathering of fifty tanks and one hundred other vehicles,
in the morning, and was ordered to promptly return to the defences.
An attack developed but partly due to the effectiveness of the desert
air force and a big sand storm, (13.00 hours), which blew up in the
afternoon. Little damage or casualties were inflicted, (1, pg 113).
As Rommel became more focussed on the problem of the Bir Hacheim position he directed heavier artillery to reduce the fortifications
From
daybreak on the 3rd June German artillery shelled Bir
Hacheim. Using 105mm field guns, these out ranged the French 75mm
guns. It was under these conditions that the Battalion du Pacific
returned after their foray, (1, pg 114).
Between
2nd to 9th June the Luftwaffe carried out 1300
sorties against the defensive box. After defeating the British in the
Cauldron fighting Rommel now turned his attention to Bir Hacheim.
This was because he could not pursue defeated allied troops without
proper secure supply lines due to the remaining defensive box. (I
wonder if leaving a blocking force at Bir Hacheim and pursuing the
defeated Allies was not an option?), (1, pg 117).
The
Luftwaffes effectiveness was limited by the difficulty in observing
the well hidden French vehicles and defences and the regular
interdiction of the desert air force. Between 1130 and 1330 hours
four separate attacks by stukas took place. In one of these attacks,
twelve stukas were caught unescorted and lost seven of their number
As bofor gun ammunition was now running low the French were unable to
put up a strong defence, (1, pg 117).
Rommel
later described the defences as ‘skilfully prepared field positions
and strong points, slit trenches, light machine gun and anti tank
positions dotted all over the terrain with each separate strong point
surrounded by a strong mine belt. This kind of fortification is
practically proof against artillery fire and air attack, as all a
direct hit can do destroy one small slit trench or so. A very high
expenditure of ammunition is necessary to inflict real damage’, (1,
pg 117).
As the bombardment becomes more intense the defenders look for cover and attempt to fill in the gaps in the perimetre
Friedrich
Von Mellenthin, a staff officer in the Afrika Korps stated ‘he had
never been confronted, during the whole Western Desert Campaign, to
such a relentless and heroic defence’, (5, pg 4).
Fierce
British patrols also harassed the Axis forces facing Bir Hacheim,
(Trieste Division and 90th Light Division), interfering
with the axis organising for an attack and delaying desperately
needed supplies to them, (1, pg 118).
However
an attack at midday was mounted by Trieste, from the north west and
by 90th Light from the south east. Supported by artillery
and aerial attacks they were both repulsed. Resupply to the
beleaguered fort was also carried out that night, (1, pg 118, 119).
On
this day the Germans sent Captain Tomkins driver back to Bir Hacheim
with a note from Rommel, which read:, (1, pg 117).
To
the troops at Bir Hacheim,
Any
further resistance will serve to spill more blood to no avail. You
will suffer the same fate as the two British detachments that were
annihilated at Got el Ualeb two days ago.
We
shall cease fire when you raise the white flag and come forward
unarmed’, (10, pg 286, 1, pg 117).
Tradition
has it that Koenig’s reply to this note was ‘Go to the Devil’
however as the original note was delivered by a POW I doubt this
message would have been physically sent. It is also stated that
Koenig made no reply and instead issued a number of morale boosting
orders to the defending troops, (1, pg 118).
The
4th June continued the same as the 3rd with
shelling, bombing and further attacks which were repulsed. Through
continuous use the defenders 75mm field guns fired 2500 rounds,
leaving only 500 left. That night a further supply convoy delivered
6000 more 75mm shells, (1, pg 119).
The
Britsh command contacted Koenig on this day and reported that they
were to launch Operation Aberdeen and that this could divert axis
forces from attacking the French position.
On
the 5th June, at 04.00 hours there was a visit from a
German officer who again asked the French defenders to surrender.
After a sentry refused entry as per his orders the kublewagen
carrying the officer promptly drove over a mine. The occupants got
out of the vehicle unharmed and continued their journey on foot, (1,
pg 119).
With
sufficient ammunition the French field guns could intensify their
fire but were considerably out ranged by the now 155mm guns the
Germans were now using. In an effort to close the range the defenders
moved their field guns forward of their positions. This tactic had a
hand in stopping German attacks by light flak and infantry later that
day, (1, pg 119), and could not approach closer than 1500 yards to
the defence perimeter.
Views of the German armour as it crosses the French minefield
On
the 6th June two attacks by the axis, began at 11.00 hours
and concentrated on the south west sector of the defences. Thanks to
infiltration into the minefield overnight the enemy breached the
mines during the attack and got with 800 metres of the perimetre but
failed to reach the ruins of the fort. However the defenders,
(Battalion du Pacific), took heavy casualties. This attack was
carried out by the 90th Light Division with assault
pioneers commanded by General Kleeman, (Knights Cross & Oak
Leaves), newly arrived from the Eastern Front. The defending 75mm
field guns played a part in beating off both attacks, from the west,
but fire had to be rationed again due to falling stocks of ammunition
again, (5, pg 4, 1, pg 121).
On
Saturday 7th June the Royal Air Force assisted by carrying
out four air raids against Italian and German attacks. This may have
contributed to French reports describing this day as ‘quiet’, (1,
pg 121).
Axis
bombardment died down to only one stuka raid. The French observation
post to the north of Bir Hacheim was finally overrun and the
occupants retreated to within the perimeter, (1, pg 121).
The
axis tank forces spent the day sending their vehicles forward and
then retreating in a ruse to provoke the defenders anti tank guns so
they could be located and picked off in preparation for the next
attack. This failed to work, (8, pg 10).
Early
on the 8th June an important convoy arrived early in the
morning, (04.00 hours) under the cover of darkness bringing munitions
and 2000 litres of water in fifteen vehicles. Over half of this
convoy was fired on by the enemy and lost in the fog and dark. This
covered the convoy but also allowed the DAK to prepare for another
attack. The French defenders could hear track noises in the fog with
Rommel adding further elements of 15 Panzer Division to the
attackers, (1, pg 121, 8, pg).
An
artillery bombardment started at 07.30 hours aided by sixty Ju88
bombers. The whole fortress was methodically subjected to intensive
bombardment until 21.00 hours that night. An attack on the NW sector,
defended by the 6th Company Du Marche, and point 168, which had an
AOP to guide the 75mm field guns in the fortress. During this time
the hospital was hit, during an attack by 42 stukas, despite being
clearly marked, killing forty seven wounded, (8, pg 11).
The
defences in the north west sector were damaged, but not seriously and
the men of the Battalion du Marche were instructed to allow the tanks
to drive over or past their positions then attack the infantry that
would be in support of the tanks, (8, pg 11). Supporting the
defenders were a bren carrier company of the French Foreign Legion
and when the company of the Battalion du Marche received grievous
casualties they were replaced with the 22nd North African
Company, (1, pg 121).
Italian troops storm the tremches to push back the defenders
The
German forces comprised the 15th Panzer Division and
General Hackers pioneers. They managed to break through the
perimeter, supported by a further attack with sixty stukas. This
attack was also commanded by Rommel, (9, pg 4). During this time the
hospital was hit, despite being clearly marked, killing forty seven
wounded, (1, pg 125).
The
Legion bren carrier company, commanded by officer cadet aspirant
Morvan, intervened and drove the German forces out of the French
positions, (9, pg 5).
During
the day General Koenigs telephone lines were cut and continuous
bombing took place until 21.00 hours, (1, pg 122).
Rommel
described the situation as, ‘yet on the next morning, (8th),
when my troops attacked again, they were welcomed again by the same
heavy fire they suffered the day before. The enemy was hiding in
individual holes, remaining invisible. I had to take Bir Hacheim, the
fate of my army was depending on it.‘, (9, pg 4).
The
artillery observation post at point 186 was targeted by one on the
attacks and this reduced fire from the French 75mm guns that were
being directed.
At
this point General Saint-Hillier recounts an incident when the crew
of a 75mm field gun was hit by an 88mm HE round. The remaining
Legionnaire, with only his left hand remaining reloads and destroyed
the 88mm gun firing at him, (8, pg 4).
The
RAF tried to supply Bir Hacheim a number of times during the day. One
time with medical supplies but the parachute failed to open
destroying its contents. Another time 170 litres of water was
successfully supplied by another air drop, (8, pg 5).
Further views of other French forces and defences
General
Koenig received a message from General De Gaulle stating ‘Hear and
tell your troops: the whole of France is watching you, you are our
pride’ Koenig was also told that he could evacuate on the 11th,
(1, pg 123).
At
this time the French defenders are believed to have been joined by a
force of 400 men from the Zionist Jewish Brigade. This unit was
situated just north of Bir Hacheim and were laying mines when they
were attacked by German forces. They stood little chance as they had
no heavy weapons. Led by a majot Leibmann they resisted DAK and
Italian attacks and joined the French on 11 June.
There
is little record of this unit but this story was related to military
history students by Gunther Rothenberg.
On
Tuesday 9th June Bir Hacheim was attacked in the north
west and south again. At 08.30 hours bombing by sixty aircraft
supported a combined attack by tanks and infantry on the Battalion du
Pacific and Battalion du Marche drove a wedge between the two
companies of the battalion du Marche. Intense and prolonged hand to
hand fighting ended with the intervention of a Legion bren carrier
company, (1, pg 123).
In
the south of the perimeter elements of the 90th Light
Division, with artillery support, turned the flank of another company
of the Battalion de Pacific but were repulsed losing 250 casualties.
The Germans used false radio messages to confuse the defenders.
During another attack in the area of the old fort in the south west
sector of the defences. Troops of Colonel Heckers pioneers, who had
lost ten out of eleven tanks in twenty four hours fighting, was
reinforced by two infantry battalions of Gruppe Baade, from 115
Panzer Regiment. They were badly mauled in the fighting but
established a position 200 metres from the fortress perimeter, (1, pg
125).
At 20.00 hours, sunset, a renewed attack by stukas caused a number
of losses to the garrison when a dressing station was hit, killing
nineteen wounded and supply lorries carrying rations for the
Battalion du Pacific. Also artillery hit a command post killing a
number of officers, (including Lieutenant Colonel Broche and Adjutant
Captain de Bricourt), (1, pg 125).
General
Ritchie had urged Koenig to hold on but at 17.00 hours Koenig
received permission to break out. Koenig said he would do this if he
had sufficient transport and cover from the RAF. 7th
Armoured Division could not supply this until the 10th so
with ammunition and water low the French defenders had to remain for
one more day, (9, pg 5, 8, pg 12).
On
the 10th June the morning started with an air raid of 110
aircraft dropping 130 tons of bombs, (1, pg 125). An early morning
artillery bombardment heralded an attack on the Oubangui-Chari and
3rd Legion Etrange Battalion by the remaining troops of
Gruppe Baard and tanks from the 15th Panzer Division, (9,
pg 5). This was finally repulsed using the last mortar rounds. After
another attack, two hours later the Germans postponed any further
attacks until the next day, unaware the defenders had practically run
out of ammunition, (9, pg 5).
The
earlier attack was commanded by Rommel who wrote: ‘with the French
desperately defending every single nest of resistance and suffering
terrible casualties as a result, (1, pg 125).
Field
Marshal Kesselring started to become concerned over Luftwaffe losses
which he needed to attack Malta and wanted Rommel to use his tanks,
but Rommel did not want to do this as they were so difficult to
replace, (1, pg 125).
Preparations
were started to break out from Bir Hacheim by clearing a path through
the surrounding minefield. A 150 yard wide channel to the west, (not
east), was started while vehicles from 7th Motor Brigade
grouped together five miles south west of Bir Hacheim, (1, pg 126).
Two
companies of French Foreign Legion would stay behind until the end.
The remaining Legion would be last to leave to cover the withdrawal,
(1, pg 126).
It
took longer than expected to load the lorries but the evacuation
started at 20.30 hours, (I query this as although it would be getting
darker it is Summer and it would be still possible to observe these
movements at this time), (1, pg 126).
When
the evacuation started the medical convoy pulled out followed by the
Battalion de Pacific, Battalion du Marche and Fusilier Marins. The
remaining Foreign Legion, apart from two companies, would leave last,
(1, pg 126).
The
Fusilier Marins drove a gun and tow into a shell crater, due to
faulty navigation. German artillery continued to fire on the Bir
Hacheim position. This set some vehicles on fire and this illuminated
the escaping defenders, (1, pg 126).
At
this point the escaping column turned south planning to go round the
southerly end of the defences, came upon some DAK positions, (Those
200 metres from the perimeter mentioned previously in the text).
General Koenig sent forces commanded by captain Lamaze and Bricogne
to clear any enemy blocking the escape. Both officers along with
Lieutenant Dewey, (British liaison?), were killed at this point, (1,
pg 126).
The
column continued its progress while still under fire and appeared to
have strayed into the minefield at one point. General Koenig ordered
his driver Susan Travers to drive to the front of the column and lead
the way stating, ‘Where we lead the rest will follow’. Travers
later wrote, ‘It is a delightful feeling going as fast as you can
in the dark. My main concern was that the engine would stall!’,
(11, pg 179).
The
rest of the French column continued their escape along with the
Foreign Legion that had now left the fortress, (1, pg 126).
General
Koenig was one of the first to arrive at the extraction point, set up
by the British, at 04.00 hours on the 11th June. He felt a
sense of despair as at first it appeared the number of men who had
escaped from Bir Hacheim had been very minimal and grew until at
08.00 hours most of the columns had returned, (11, pg 186).
Final
losses for the defenders are difficult to ascertain as casualties
figures can be mixed between the fighting period and the evacuation
and some times these figures are combined. Here are the most accurate
I can ascertain from a number of sources:, (5, pg 6).
Siege: Killed 99
Wounded 19
Evacuation Killed 42
Wounded 210
Captured 814
Total
Losses 1184
(11,
pg 190, 5, pg 6, 1, pg 126-7)
The
amount of defenders killed during the siege appears low considering
the amount of bombing and artillery fire that took place. However the
comments Rommel made about the quality of the defences meant that
little other than a direct hit had any effect. Also the ability of
the French to evacuate the injured overnight may also have kept
fatalities down. However the loss of 47 wounded when the hospital was
hit on the 8th June and the dressing station being hit
killing 19 further men on the 9th June leaves only another
33 killed over the rest of the siege. This seems incredibly low, (5,
pg 6).
Losses
in the two legion battalions were worst as they had stayed until the
end to cover the breakout. Only 650 out of 1000 remained. Susan
Travers writes that ‘much of the African battalion who had been
killed or taken prisoner’, (11, pg 190).
Material
losses: 75mm field guns 53
47mm
field guns 5
Bofors
guns 8
Various
vehicles 50
Compared
to the order of battle of the defenders there are more 75mm MLE 1897
field guns lost that were in the OOB. I suspect there were some in
the FFL battalions, (ST).
The
serviceability of many of the remaining vehicles would have been
questionable as after at least one column lost its way crossing the
minefield and the majority of the escaping force had to run the
gauntlet of machine gun fire. Many would have been damaged beyond
repair. For example the staff car driven by Susan Travers had eleven
bullet holes in the bonnet, one of which had passed through the front
seat between her and Koenig. Several had passed through the radiator
and others had sheared off parts of the bodywork. The break pipes had
been shot through so they did not work and none of the shock
absorbers functioned and the rest of the body work was peppered with
shrapnel, (11, pg 195).
At
the end of the evacuation 2700 men out of 3600, (2, pg 62), from the
original force regained the lines. This does not match the casualty
figures above.
The
value of the resistance of the 1st Free French Brigade to
the British and Commonwealth troops is incalculable. If they had not
stayed in their defences Rommel’s forces could have pursued the
remaining British forces back past the El Alamein line and deep into
Egypt. The loss of Tobruk would have given Rommel the supplies he
needed to continue the pursuit and the British would not have had the
time to build the defensive line at El Alamein. This could have
completely changed the complexion of the Desert War.
While
there is little written in British about this battle the French hold
it in very high regard with Paris having a bridge and a railway
station named after the battle.
With
the various attacking forces during the siege from Italian armoured
and mixed formations to the bulk of 15th Panzer Division
there is a large choice and the defenders have a wide and varied
range of ‘odd’ artillery and vehicles. Even the French night time
patrols could be played if you have a satisfactory way to represent
fighting at night.
Sources:
1,
Bir Hacheim Richard Holmes Pam/Ballantine
2,
Gazala 1942 Ken Ford Osprey
3,
Iron Hulls Iron Hearts Ian W Walker Crowood
4,
Rommels Intelligence in the Desert Campaign Hans-Otto
Behtendt William Kimber
5,
Rapid Fire! Montys Desert Battles Rapid Fire! Richard Marsh
6,
Military Modelling, Battle of Bir Hacheim June 1986 Stuart Asquith
7,
La Bataille de Bir Hakeim 1942 (70)
La bataille de Bir Hakeim 1942 - YouTube
8.1942
Bir Hakeim in English 1942
Bir Hakeim (in english) – 1ère DFl (1dfl.fr)
9.Battle
of Bir Hacheim Battle
of Bir Hakeim - Wikipedia
10.The
Desert War Then and Now Jean Paul Pallud After the Battle
Publications
11.Tomorrow
to be Free Susan Travers Bantam Press
12.Axis
History Forum Topic Bir
Hakeim Africa Korps against Foreign Legion - Axis History Forum
