Hello There. I have had an interest in this little known battle for many years, since reading about it in an old copy of Military Modelling, and I have decided to expand on the limited resources in English, to make this battle more available to wargamers that are interested in the Desert War.
Part of this feature was used for a feature in Wargames, Soldier and Strategy and this has been magnified to produce this work.
The Battle of Bir Hacheim has slipped by many British wargamers and students of military history, probably because of the almost total lack of British involvement despite the importance of the result on the 8th Army at the time. This has lead to a lack of English language sources.
History books merely state that the small fortress held out against Rommel and the Afrika Korps while the remainder of the army withdrew to safety at El Alamein, a name that provides a whole different chapter in the history of the desert war, (6).
I first became aware of the battle when I read a feature in the June 1986 edition of Military Modelling by Stuart Asquith. The illustrations by Rick Scollins also caught my eye. Both contributors now departed and a sad and great loss to the wargaming world they both are, (6).
Here is a description of the days at Bir Hacheim, as far as my meagre interpretation of French and the scarce internet and written sources can allow.
Here are some photos of different games refighting different parts of the defence of Bir Hacheim. The trench system is modular and all scratchbuilt.
At 0430 hours on the 26th May 1942 General Erwin Rommel showed General Sir Claude Auchinlek that he had won the race to rearm and resupply his forces to recommence the struggle in North Africa for control of the area, (2 pg 33).
After a number of see-saw engagements since 11 June 1940, first between British and Italian forces, then later axis and British/Commonwealth troops Rommel was now attacking the Allied defensive line bulk stretching from Gazala on the coast to Bir Hacheim, (also Bir Hakeim), in the desert interior, (2, pg 12).
Rommels plan was to mislead Auchinlek’s subordinate, Lieutenant General Neil Ritchie, (commander of Eighth Army), into expecting an attack in the centre and north of the Gazala line. This would induce the British commanders to deploy their armour into the area while Rommel would turn the open flank of the defensive line and allow him to attack the allied and commonwealth forces in the flank and rear, (2 pg 32).
This ruse would be aided by Gruppe Cruwell, consisting of the Italian X and XXI Corps, (Sabratha, Trento, Brescia and Pavia divisions),the bulk of the German artillery, a German infantry brigade and two Italian armoured regiments, attacking positions held by the British 50th Division and the 1st South African Division. These forces were situated between the ‘road’, the Trig Capuzzo, and the coast. The armoured forces were accompanied by earo engines mounted on lorries which stirred up dust to simulate the movement of large numbers of vehicles. These vehicles were meant to be visible to make the British think this was the main offensive, (3, pg 114). The armour would then be withdrawn from the attack once the allies came to the conclusion they were under an all arms attack. The axis armoured divisions would then be sent south to turn the open flank joining further armoured units under Rommel’s command, (15th, 21st Panzer Divisions, 90th Light, Ariete and Trieste Divisions), (1 pg 84, 2, pg 33)
The British forces had deployed four divisions and two brigades in the north of the defensive line and only two divisions and three brigades in the south.
The plan went well, to begin with. The British commanders, (Ritchie and Norrie), did not know if the enemy movements south of Bir Hacheim were a feint, to draw their forces south, which would leave their centre weak, or if Rommel was attempting to turn their flank and draw their forces away from the main attack. Ritchie expected Rommel to drive straight for Tobruk, (2, pg 35, 1, pg 87).
New German intelligence received just before the start of the assault discovered the end of the Gazala line, (3, pg 114), This prompted the diverting of the Italian Ariete, (armoured) and Trieste, (all arms) Divisions to take the position manned by the 1st Free French Brigade, (4, pg112). Unfortunately Trieste division did not get their change of orders so did not change their direction of advance so entered the minefields of the Gazala line north of Bir Hacheim, receiving artillery fire from the British 150th Brigade ‘box’, (some sources say that the Italian commander did not make a mistake in his navigation but diverted part of his force to deal with the artillery fire which was engaging his flank), (12). The Trieste Division began to clear a narrow passage through the minefield but were hindered in their early movements by a sudden sand storm which did not aid their navigation, (8, pg 112-4).
I find it difficult to believe that the DAK knew about the Gazala line but not where it were it ended since it was being built since 14 February and wash the critical flank to be turned, (ST). Also the intelligence sources Rommel had access to was extensive and I feel would not have been this misleading.
Meanwhile the larger force of Ariete, 90th light and 15th Panzer Division were being observed from a distance driving around the flank of the Gazala line by the 4th South African Armoured Car Regiment on 27th May at 06.30 hours, (2, pg 33).
The Ariete Division, commanded by General Guiseppe De Stefanis, (3, pg 114), encountered a fortified position, another position DAK intelligence failed to detect, (3, pg 114). Actually it was point 171, slightly south east of the Bir Hacheim position manned by the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade. Believing it to be Bir Hacheim, at 0730 hours, they deployed the 8th Armoured Battalion on the left, 9th Armoured battalion to the right followed by the 10th Armoured Battalion and 8th Bersaglieri Regiment. Softskin vehicles of the Axis attackers scattered as they came under artillery fire, (3, pg 114).
As this was in progress the remainder of the Axis forces bypassed this defensive works. Brigadier Filose, commander of the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade reported to Major General Messervy at 7th Armoured Division HQ that, ‘The whole bloody Africa Corps is drawn up in front of me like a bloody review’, (4, pg 156). This report made the situation clearer for General Ritchie, (4, pg 156). Although Brigadier Filose was only being attacked by the Ariete Division he was bypassed by the 90th Light who went onto attack the ‘Retma Box’ further to the east of Bir Hacheim, manned by the British 7th Motor Brigade and the 7th Armoured Division. The 21st and 15th Panzer divisions began to swing north, behind the Gazala Line, (2, pg 33, 35).
Back with the Italian attack at point 171 the defending 3rd Indian Motor Brigade the 18th Cavalry Regiment and 2nd Royal Lancers were quickly overrun. This was in part due to the defenders having only just been deployed recently to the area. They had little chance to improve the defences of the position so were only partially dug in and at the time of the attack had only received 30 of their 64 2pdr anti tank guns. The 3rd Indian Motor Brigade suffered 453 killed and lost 600 prisoners in the attack. The rest dispersed into the desert towards allied lines, (3, pg 114).
The attacking Italian forces learned from their prisoners that they had not captured Bir Hacheim after all and now turned north to attack their intended target, (3, pg 116).
They approached the French barb wire at 08.15 hours from the south east leading the defenders to initially believe they were British tanks, (3, pg 116, 117).
Due to the late change of orders Ariete Division had no idea where the Trieste Division had gone however they charged at the French position at 09.00 hours. They broke the barb wire perimeter near the east entrance and started to cross the anti tank minefield, which they were not aware of until too late. Once in front of the east entrance they made a quarter turn to the left and charged. The first anti tank shells were fired at 400 metres and the last at a few metres, (3, pg 116, 117).
The commander of the 9th Armoured Battalion, Colonel Prestisimone, who had already had one tank knocked out under him that day, now lost another tank but broke into the defensive box with five other tanks. One of these tanks fired a shell into the company HQ at fifteen yards range, without killing the officer inside, and a Captain Morel of the French Foreign Legion burnt the company flag to stop it falling into enemy hands, (3, pg 116, 117, 118, 8, pg 4). Capitan Otte continued giving orders on the field telephone until a tank appeared 15 yards from his position and a shell went through his shelter, (1, pg 107). This reference says Capt Otte burnt the company flag.
The remaining surviving tank crews were taken prisoner. An indication of the multi national nature of this battle, one Italian tank crew found himself being made prisoned by two fellow Venetians! Colonel Prestimone was also injured and taken prisoner, (3, pg 117).
A second attack by the Ariete Division at 11.30 hours failed to breech the minefield and the tanks withdrew at 10.00 hours after losing 31 tanks, 1 semovente, 124 causalities and 60 prisoners, (3, pg 116). In comparison the defenders lost a handful of casualties, 1 gun and a truck. During this attack a legionnaire staff sergeant resorted to clearing a jammed shell in a 75mm field gun using a ramrod and a hammer down the barrel of the gun! (3, pg 117, 8, pg4).
At this point, still on the 27th, the 90th Light Division and other DAK forces to the north were being attacked by strong British forces and Ariete Division were called upon to assist them at Bir El Harmat. The rest of the day was quiet for the Bir Hacheim defenders, (3, pg 117).
The 28th May dawned to find Rommel arriving at General Ettore Baldassarre’s HQ, (Newly promoted to command the Italian XX Motorised Corps). The Ariete Division had arrived after their attack on Bir Hacheim and had escorted supply trucks to meet the 90th Light at Rigel Ridge, (3, pg 118).
Little happened during this day. In the morning aircraft from the RAF bombed part of the area around the fortress. This was because they had mistaken the Abandoned Italian vehicles in the minefield as Axis held ground, (8, pg 4). Captain Lamaze led a group out to destroy these vehicles to stop them receiving further attention. He also led a detachment to engage Italian armoured cars which were observing the northern minefield. In later reports two of these armoured cars were destroyed and four more drove into the minefield and were damaged, (1, pg 108).
Later the Luftwaffe attacked Bir Hacheim for the first time and causalities were inflicted on the Battalion du Pacific who were manning the south west sector of the defences. In turn the RAF carried out air attacks on the Axis forces around Bir Hacheim, (3, pg 108).
A column was sent out during the day to make contact with the 150th Brigade box to the north of the fortress. This was driven back by Italian artillery fire but the column also inflicted losses on some of the pursuing Italian vehicles, (9, pg 3). In one reference, (9, pg 3), it states that seven enemy half tracks were destroyed. Captain Lamaze was tasked with covering enemy attempts to clear the northern minefield. Two enemy armoured cars were destroyed and four more drove into the minefield and were lost, (1, pg 108).
As this incident and Captain Lamaze’ attacks on Italian armoured cars to the north of Bir Hacheim defences are from different sources and are in roughly the same area they maybe the same incident. I have been unable to clarify this, (ST, 1, pg 108).
During the night of 28th/29th May further supplies were bought in, in the shape of forty tons of 75mm ammunition. The defenders maintained an aggressive stance carrying out night time patrols and taking a number of Italians prisoner, (3, pg 108).
The 29th May was quiet with further patrolling carried out. This resulted in three German tanks claimed destroyed by a patrol led by Captain de Saringe. These may have been Italian vehicles as the German forces were now in the ‘cauldron’ behind the Gazala line and the further prisoners taken were Italian, (9, pg 3).
The defenders heard on this day that the British 4th Armoured and 7th Infantry Brigades had been pushed back to Bir El Gobi and El Aden, meaning they were now surrounded. However General Koenig still had time to apologise to the Italian prisoners for the poor standard of their conditions, (9, pg 3, 1, pg 112).
On the 30th May the axis forces had been making continuous infiltrations into the minefields of the Gazala line and Bir Hacheim defences, (9, pg 33).
X Corps, consisting of the Sabratha, Trento, Bresicia and Pavia Infantry Divisions had been assaulting the Gazala Line far to the north, opposite the defensive boxes of, (from north to south), the 3rd South African, 2nd South African, 1st South African and 69th Brigades. Progress had been made through the minefield, (1, pg 78,79).
The Trieste division was still progressing through similar defences opposite 150th Infantry Brigade but the path cleared was inadequate to pass supplies through as it was under artillery fire from the defensive box and Sidi Muftah behind it, (3, pg 120). Rommels intelligence unit now discovered the presence of the 150th Brigade and needed to clear this area to supply axis forces behind the Gazala Line, so avoiding the round trip beyond Bir Hacheim and saving precious petrol, (3, pg 120, 1, pg 110).
At Bir Hacheim patrols were sent out to seal any breaches in the minefield but these troops, led by Colonel Amilakhvari were ambushed and rescued by a company of infantry with bren carriers commanded by Lieutenant Messmer, (9, pg 3).
620 thirsty Indian soldiers entered the position today. These were the remains of the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade, (from point 171), (9, pg 3), and they brought news that four of their 25lb field guns were abandoned at their original position. A patrol was arranged to retrieve what they could to aid in the defence of Bir Hacheim. Three guns were recovered, (No Reference). Some of these Indian troops also described how they had been taken prisoner then released into the desert as the axis forces had no facilities to detain them. This could also have been done to deliberately strain the water supplies at Bir Hacheim, (9, pg 3, 1, pg 112).
The end of the 30th and the start of the 31st, was quiet at Bir Hacheim as Rommel and the axis forces were gathering to attack 150th Infantry Brigade to improve his supply lines. Bir Hacheims minefields had been breached in places by axis night patrols but these were known to the defenders and used as cleared lanes for the French to mount day time patrols led by Colonel Amilakvari and Lieutenant Colonel Roux to harass the Axis forces in the area, (1, pg 112).
On 31st May, General Koenig received orders from British XXX Corps to be ready to advance some of his forces, I assume to frustrate Axis build up of troops, armour and supplies fighting in the ‘Cauldron’. This force was to comprise of the Battalion du Pacific, an anti tank, anti aircraft and artillery components, (1, pg 112).
Rommel was caused to retreat due to attacks from the 150 brigade box. He would continue attacks on the next day, (9, pg 3)
During the night of the 31st, part of the 101st transport company arrived commanded by Captain Dulau. They bought urgently needed water for the defenders. On return they removed the Indian soldiers, 170 Italian prisoners and various French and Axis wounded, (1, pg 112, 10, pg 282).
On the 1st June the 150th Brigade box fell to Rommels forces at 14.30 hours but his supply route was still threatened by the troops in Bir Hacheim, (2, pg 52, 10, pg 278).
The column, mentioned earlier, left the fortress defences today, (1, pg 112). Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Broche. Both this column and Bir Hacheim were attacked by Axis aircraft, (1, pg 112). This column reached El Telm by night fall but unfortunately this order was later countermanded by XXX Corps but Koenig was unable to contact the column due to poor and intermittent radio communications they could not be recalled the same day. They were finally contacted on 2nd June, (1, pg 113, 8, pg 5).
The Naval Fusiliers that were operating the bofors anti aircraft guns they had been recently trained on, (so recently that they were not able to carry out their final exam due to enemy attacks on Bir Hacheim), but appear to have given an effective account of themselves, (1, pg 113).
The Infanterie de la marine, (commanded by Captain Laborde), the 22nd North African Company, (Captain Lequense) and a battery of 75mm guns were moved to fill the gap in the defences left by the Battalion de Pacific, (1, pg113).
Overnight a further supplies arrived in the shape of 1000 bofors gun rounds, (1, pg 113). Also on this night the American Field Service, (AFS), were requested to evacuate wounded from Bir Hacheim. They drove to the defence this night, arrived at 0700 hours on the 2nd and hid in a sandstorm to get back to their lines.
On 2nd June General Koenig had considered reporting to 7th Armoured Division HQ, to get clarification of the situation outside of Bir Hacheim. He decided to send his British liaison, Captain Tomkins. This was fortuitous as Tomkins was captured by a German reconnaissance patrol while travelling to 7th Armoured Division HQ, (1, pg 113).
Meanwhile the Column led by Colonel Broche, was unknown. All contact had been lost as their radios had failed. Koenig finally managed to contact the Battalion du Pacific and ordered them to return to Bir Hacheim.
Rommel still needed to secure his supply lines by eliminating resistance at Bir Hacheim. To achieve this he sent the Italian Trieste Division, armoured reconnaissance units from the Pavia Division and the German 90th Light Division. The German force would attack from the south and the Italians from the north, (5, pg 3).
Before this attack materialised two Italian officers approached the outer defences at 10.30 hours. Under a flag of truce they were blindfolded and taken to General Koenig. Unfortunately Koenig and Masson, (Koenigs Chief staff officer), could not speak Italian and the officers could not speak French. After a confused exchange it was believed the Italian officers offered terms of surrender to avoid further lives being lost. This offer was politely refused and the officers returned to the perimeter. It is believed that Koenig reported, ‘We have not come here to surrender’, (8, pg 6, 1, pg 114).
Captain Lamaze, who was commanding a detachment outside of Bir Hacheim reported a gathering of fifty tanks and one hundred other vehicles, in the morning, and was ordered to promptly return to the defences. An attack developed but partly due to the effectiveness of the desert air force and a big sand storm, (13.00 hours), which blew up in the afternoon. Little damage or casualties were inflicted, (1, pg 113).
From daybreak on the 3rd June German artillery shelled Bir Hacheim. Using 105mm field guns, these out ranged the French 75mm guns. It was under these conditions that the Battalion du Pacific returned after their foray, (1, pg 114).
Between 2nd to 9th June the Luftwaffe carried out 1300 sorties against the defensive box. After defeating the British in the Cauldron fighting Rommel now turned his attention to Bir Hacheim. This was because he could not pursue defeated allied troops without proper secure supply lines due to the remaining defensive box. (I wonder if leaving a blocking force at Bir Hacheim and pursuing the defeated Allies was not an option?), (1, pg 117).
The Luftwaffes effectiveness was limited by the difficulty in observing the well hidden French vehicles and defences and the regular interdiction of the desert air force. Between 1130 and 1330 hours four separate attacks by stukas took place. In one of these attacks, twelve stukas were caught unescorted and lost seven of their number As bofor gun ammunition was now running low the French were unable to put up a strong defence, (1, pg 117).
Rommel later described the defences as ‘skilfully prepared field positions and strong points, slit trenches, light machine gun and anti tank positions dotted all over the terrain with each separate strong point surrounded by a strong mine belt. This kind of fortification is practically proof against artillery fire and air attack, as all a direct hit can do destroy one small slit trench or so. A very high expenditure of ammunition is necessary to inflict real damage’, (1, pg 117).
Friedrich Von Mellenthin, a staff officer in the Afrika Korps stated ‘he had never been confronted, during the whole Western Desert Campaign, to such a relentless and heroic defence’, (5, pg 4).
Fierce British patrols also harassed the Axis forces facing Bir Hacheim, (Trieste Division and 90th Light Division), interfering with the axis organising for an attack and delaying desperately needed supplies to them, (1, pg 118).
However an attack at midday was mounted by Trieste, from the north west and by 90th Light from the south east. Supported by artillery and aerial attacks they were both repulsed. Resupply to the beleaguered fort was also carried out that night, (1, pg 118, 119).
On this day the Germans sent Captain Tomkins driver back to Bir Hacheim with a note from Rommel, which read:, (1, pg 117).
To the troops at Bir Hacheim,
Any further resistance will serve to spill more blood to no avail. You will suffer the same fate as the two British detachments that were annihilated at Got el Ualeb two days ago.
We shall cease fire when you raise the white flag and come forward unarmed’, (10, pg 286, 1, pg 117).
Tradition has it that Koenig’s reply to this note was ‘Go to the Devil’ however as the original note was delivered by a POW I doubt this message would have been physically sent. It is also stated that Koenig made no reply and instead issued a number of morale boosting orders to the defending troops, (1, pg 118).
The 4th June continued the same as the 3rd with shelling, bombing and further attacks which were repulsed. Through continuous use the defenders 75mm field guns fired 2500 rounds, leaving only 500 left. That night a further supply convoy delivered 6000 more 75mm shells, (1, pg 119).
The Britsh command contacted Koenig on this day and reported that they were to launch Operation Aberdeen and that this could divert axis forces from attacking the French position.
On the 5th June, at 04.00 hours there was a visit from a German officer who again asked the French defenders to surrender. After a sentry refused entry as per his orders the kublewagen carrying the officer promptly drove over a mine. The occupants got out of the vehicle unharmed and continued their journey on foot, (1, pg 119).
With sufficient ammunition the French field guns could intensify their fire but were considerably out ranged by the now 155mm guns the Germans were now using. In an effort to close the range the defenders moved their field guns forward of their positions. This tactic had a hand in stopping German attacks by light flak and infantry later that day, (1, pg 119), and could not approach closer than 1500 yards to the defence perimeter.
On the 6th June two attacks by the axis, began at 11.00 hours and concentrated on the south west sector of the defences. Thanks to infiltration into the minefield overnight the enemy breached the mines during the attack and got with 800 metres of the perimetre but failed to reach the ruins of the fort. However the defenders, (Battalion du Pacific), took heavy casualties. This attack was carried out by the 90th Light Division with assault pioneers commanded by General Kleeman, (Knights Cross & Oak Leaves), newly arrived from the Eastern Front. The defending 75mm field guns played a part in beating off both attacks, from the west, but fire had to be rationed again due to falling stocks of ammunition again, (5, pg 4, 1, pg 121).
On Saturday 7th June the Royal Air Force assisted by carrying out four air raids against Italian and German attacks. This may have contributed to French reports describing this day as ‘quiet’, (1, pg 121).
Axis bombardment died down to only one stuka raid. The French observation post to the north of Bir Hacheim was finally overrun and the occupants retreated to within the perimeter, (1, pg 121).
The axis tank forces spent the day sending their vehicles forward and then retreating in a ruse to provoke the defenders anti tank guns so they could be located and picked off in preparation for the next attack. This failed to work, (8, pg 10).
Early on the 8th June an important convoy arrived early in the morning, (04.00 hours) under the cover of darkness bringing munitions and 2000 litres of water in fifteen vehicles. Over half of this convoy was fired on by the enemy and lost in the fog and dark. This covered the convoy but also allowed the DAK to prepare for another attack. The French defenders could hear track noises in the fog with Rommel adding further elements of 15 Panzer Division to the attackers, (1, pg 121, 8, pg).
An artillery bombardment started at 07.30 hours aided by sixty Ju88 bombers. The whole fortress was methodically subjected to intensive bombardment until 21.00 hours that night. An attack on the NW sector, defended by the 6th Company Du Marche, and point 168, which had an AOP to guide the 75mm field guns in the fortress. During this time the hospital was hit, during an attack by 42 stukas, despite being clearly marked, killing forty seven wounded, (8, pg 11).
The defences in the north west sector were damaged, but not seriously and the men of the Battalion du Marche were instructed to allow the tanks to drive over or past their positions then attack the infantry that would be in support of the tanks, (8, pg 11). Supporting the defenders were a bren carrier company of the French Foreign Legion and when the company of the Battalion du Marche received grievous casualties they were replaced with the 22nd North African Company, (1, pg 121).
The German forces comprised the 15th Panzer Division and General Hackers pioneers. They managed to break through the perimeter, supported by a further attack with sixty stukas. This attack was also commanded by Rommel, (9, pg 4). During this time the hospital was hit, despite being clearly marked, killing forty seven wounded, (1, pg 125).
The Legion bren carrier company, commanded by officer cadet aspirant Morvan, intervened and drove the German forces out of the French positions, (9, pg 5).
During the day General Koenigs telephone lines were cut and continuous bombing took place until 21.00 hours, (1, pg 122).
Rommel described the situation as, ‘yet on the next morning, (8th), when my troops attacked again, they were welcomed again by the same heavy fire they suffered the day before. The enemy was hiding in individual holes, remaining invisible. I had to take Bir Hacheim, the fate of my army was depending on it.‘, (9, pg 4).
The artillery observation post at point 186 was targeted by one on the attacks and this reduced fire from the French 75mm guns that were being directed.
At this point General Saint-Hillier recounts an incident when the crew of a 75mm field gun was hit by an 88mm HE round. The remaining Legionnaire, with only his left hand remaining reloads and destroyed the 88mm gun firing at him, (8, pg 4).
The RAF tried to supply Bir Hacheim a number of times during the day. One time with medical supplies but the parachute failed to open destroying its contents. Another time 170 litres of water was successfully supplied by another air drop, (8, pg 5).
General Koenig received a message from General De Gaulle stating ‘Hear and tell your troops: the whole of France is watching you, you are our pride’ Koenig was also told that he could evacuate on the 11th, (1, pg 123).
At this time the French defenders are believed to have been joined by a force of 400 men from the Zionist Jewish Brigade. This unit was situated just north of Bir Hacheim and were laying mines when they were attacked by German forces. They stood little chance as they had no heavy weapons. Led by a majot Leibmann they resisted DAK and Italian attacks and joined the French on 11 June.
There is little record of this unit but this story was related to military history students by Gunther Rothenberg.
On Tuesday 9th June Bir Hacheim was attacked in the north west and south again. At 08.30 hours bombing by sixty aircraft supported a combined attack by tanks and infantry on the Battalion du Pacific and Battalion du Marche drove a wedge between the two companies of the battalion du Marche. Intense and prolonged hand to hand fighting ended with the intervention of a Legion bren carrier company, (1, pg 123).
In the south of the perimeter elements of the 90th Light Division, with artillery support, turned the flank of another company of the Battalion de Pacific but were repulsed losing 250 casualties. The Germans used false radio messages to confuse the defenders. During another attack in the area of the old fort in the south west sector of the defences. Troops of Colonel Heckers pioneers, who had lost ten out of eleven tanks in twenty four hours fighting, was reinforced by two infantry battalions of Gruppe Baade, from 115 Panzer Regiment. They were badly mauled in the fighting but established a position 200 metres from the fortress perimeter, (1, pg 125).
At 20.00 hours, sunset, a renewed attack by stukas caused a number of losses to the garrison when a dressing station was hit, killing nineteen wounded and supply lorries carrying rations for the Battalion du Pacific. Also artillery hit a command post killing a number of officers, (including Lieutenant Colonel Broche and Adjutant Captain de Bricourt), (1, pg 125).
General Ritchie had urged Koenig to hold on but at 17.00 hours Koenig received permission to break out. Koenig said he would do this if he had sufficient transport and cover from the RAF. 7th Armoured Division could not supply this until the 10th so with ammunition and water low the French defenders had to remain for one more day, (9, pg 5, 8, pg 12).
On the 10th June the morning started with an air raid of 110 aircraft dropping 130 tons of bombs, (1, pg 125). An early morning artillery bombardment heralded an attack on the Oubangui-Chari and 3rd Legion Etrange Battalion by the remaining troops of Gruppe Baard and tanks from the 15th Panzer Division, (9, pg 5). This was finally repulsed using the last mortar rounds. After another attack, two hours later the Germans postponed any further attacks until the next day, unaware the defenders had practically run out of ammunition, (9, pg 5).
The earlier attack was commanded by Rommel who wrote: ‘with the French desperately defending every single nest of resistance and suffering terrible casualties as a result, (1, pg 125).
Field Marshal Kesselring started to become concerned over Luftwaffe losses which he needed to attack Malta and wanted Rommel to use his tanks, but Rommel did not want to do this as they were so difficult to replace, (1, pg 125).
Preparations were started to break out from Bir Hacheim by clearing a path through the surrounding minefield. A 150 yard wide channel to the west, (not east), was started while vehicles from 7th Motor Brigade grouped together five miles south west of Bir Hacheim, (1, pg 126).
Two companies of French Foreign Legion would stay behind until the end. The remaining Legion would be last to leave to cover the withdrawal, (1, pg 126).
It took longer than expected to load the lorries but the evacuation started at 20.30 hours, (I query this as although it would be getting darker it is Summer and it would be still possible to observe these movements at this time), (1, pg 126).
When the evacuation started the medical convoy pulled out followed by the Battalion de Pacific, Battalion du Marche and Fusilier Marins. The remaining Foreign Legion, apart from two companies, would leave last, (1, pg 126).
The Fusilier Marins drove a gun and tow into a shell crater, due to faulty navigation. German artillery continued to fire on the Bir Hacheim position. This set some vehicles on fire and this illuminated the escaping defenders, (1, pg 126).
At this point the escaping column turned south planning to go round the southerly end of the defences, came upon some DAK positions, (Those 200 metres from the perimeter mentioned previously in the text). General Koenig sent forces commanded by captain Lamaze and Bricogne to clear any enemy blocking the escape. Both officers along with Lieutenant Dewey, (British liaison?), were killed at this point, (1, pg 126).
The column continued its progress while still under fire and appeared to have strayed into the minefield at one point. General Koenig ordered his driver Susan Travers to drive to the front of the column and lead the way stating, ‘Where we lead the rest will follow’. Travers later wrote, ‘It is a delightful feeling going as fast as you can in the dark. My main concern was that the engine would stall!’, (11, pg 179).
The rest of the French column continued their escape along with the Foreign Legion that had now left the fortress, (1, pg 126).
General Koenig was one of the first to arrive at the extraction point, set up by the British, at 04.00 hours on the 11th June. He felt a sense of despair as at first it appeared the number of men who had escaped from Bir Hacheim had been very minimal and grew until at 08.00 hours most of the columns had returned, (11, pg 186).
Final losses for the defenders are difficult to ascertain as casualties figures can be mixed between the fighting period and the evacuation and some times these figures are combined. Here are the most accurate I can ascertain from a number of sources:, (5, pg 6).
Siege: Killed 99
Wounded 19
Evacuation Killed 42
Wounded 210
Captured 814
Total Losses 1184
(11, pg 190, 5, pg 6, 1, pg 126-7)
The amount of defenders killed during the siege appears low considering the amount of bombing and artillery fire that took place. However the comments Rommel made about the quality of the defences meant that little other than a direct hit had any effect. Also the ability of the French to evacuate the injured overnight may also have kept fatalities down. However the loss of 47 wounded when the hospital was hit on the 8th June and the dressing station being hit killing 19 further men on the 9th June leaves only another 33 killed over the rest of the siege. This seems incredibly low, (5, pg 6).
Losses in the two legion battalions were worst as they had stayed until the end to cover the breakout. Only 650 out of 1000 remained. Susan Travers writes that ‘much of the African battalion who had been killed or taken prisoner’, (11, pg 190).
Material losses: 75mm field guns 53
47mm field guns 5
Bofors guns 8
Various vehicles 50
Compared to the order of battle of the defenders there are more 75mm MLE 1897 field guns lost that were in the OOB. I suspect there were some in the FFL battalions, (ST).
The serviceability of many of the remaining vehicles would have been questionable as after at least one column lost its way crossing the minefield and the majority of the escaping force had to run the gauntlet of machine gun fire. Many would have been damaged beyond repair. For example the staff car driven by Susan Travers had eleven bullet holes in the bonnet, one of which had passed through the front seat between her and Koenig. Several had passed through the radiator and others had sheared off parts of the bodywork. The break pipes had been shot through so they did not work and none of the shock absorbers functioned and the rest of the body work was peppered with shrapnel, (11, pg 195).
At the end of the evacuation 2700 men out of 3600, (2, pg 62), from the original force regained the lines. This does not match the casualty figures above.
The value of the resistance of the 1st Free French Brigade to the British and Commonwealth troops is incalculable. If they had not stayed in their defences Rommel’s forces could have pursued the remaining British forces back past the El Alamein line and deep into Egypt. The loss of Tobruk would have given Rommel the supplies he needed to continue the pursuit and the British would not have had the time to build the defensive line at El Alamein. This could have completely changed the complexion of the Desert War.
While there is little written in British about this battle the French hold it in very high regard with Paris having a bridge and a railway station named after the battle.
With the various attacking forces during the siege from Italian armoured and mixed formations to the bulk of 15th Panzer Division there is a large choice and the defenders have a wide and varied range of ‘odd’ artillery and vehicles. Even the French night time patrols could be played if you have a satisfactory way to represent fighting at night.
Sources:
1, Bir Hacheim Richard Holmes Pam/Ballantine
2, Gazala 1942 Ken Ford Osprey
3, Iron Hulls Iron Hearts Ian W Walker Crowood
4, Rommels Intelligence in the Desert Campaign Hans-Otto Behtendt William Kimber
5, Rapid Fire! Montys Desert Battles Rapid Fire! Richard Marsh
6, Military Modelling, Battle of Bir Hacheim June 1986 Stuart Asquith
7, La Bataille de Bir Hakeim 1942 (70) La bataille de Bir Hakeim 1942 - YouTube
8.1942 Bir Hakeim in English 1942 Bir Hakeim (in english) – 1ère DFl (1dfl.fr)
9.Battle of Bir Hacheim Battle of Bir Hakeim - Wikipedia
10.The Desert War Then and Now Jean Paul Pallud After the Battle Publications
11.Tomorrow to be Free Susan Travers Bantam Press
12.Axis History Forum Topic Bir Hakeim Africa Korps against Foreign Legion - Axis History Forum
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